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Abstract 
 
It is a known fact that Android mobile phones’ security has room for improvement. Many malicious app developers have targeted      
android mobile phones, mainly because android as an open operating system provides great flexibility to developers and there are many 
android phones which do not have the latest security updates. With the update of marshmallow in android, applications request           
permission only during runtime, but not all users have this update. This is important because user permission is required to perform    
certain actions. The permissions may be irrelevant to the features provided by an application. The purpose of this research is to          
investigate the use and security risk of seeming irrelevant permissions in applications available from Google store. Two different        
applications which seem to ask irrelevant permissions during installation were selected from Google store. To test these applications, 
static analysis, dynamic analysis and reverse engineering tools were used. Findings show potentially malicious behavior, demonstrating 
that downloading apps from Google play store do not guarantee security. 
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1. Introduction 
Android has the largest mobile phone market share of around 80% of all 
mobile phones, but fewer than 5% of phones are running on the current 
version of Android Oreo, which was released recently. With the new 
update of Oreo in Android, the application now displays all permissions 
and request permission only during runtime. This is important because 
user permission is required to perform certain actions. Permissions can be 
manipulative and irrelevant to the features provided by an application. 
Thus, if not understood well by app users, can result in exploitation of 
confidential data [1]. Two different applications were selected from 
Google store, as they ask irrelevant permissions during installation. How-
ever, there are other apps that can perform the same functions, with fewer 
and only relevant permissions. The primary objective of this research is to 
test these applications by performing static and dynamic analysis and use 
reverse engineering tools to analyze the source code about the usage of 
the collected data and permissions. 
2. Security Vulnerabilities 
Attackers create a variety of applications of different behaviors as per the 
data they are targeting. Three main types of application behavior are: 
malicious behavior, moderate risk behavior and dangerous behavior [2]. 
Apps that show malicious behavior can gain root access of a device and 
steal secret credentials. These apps can also access device management 
and communicate with malicious IP address and domains. Moderate risk 
behaviors apps are generally deployed by entrusting and unknown 
sources which mainly focus on reading or sending emails, SMS messag-
es and GPS information. Applications with dangerous behaviors can steal 
the user’s information without notifying him and upload it on an app 
server or sell it to advertising companies or analytic companies or data 
aggregation companies. 
The following section describes [3] where the collected data could be 
leaked to malicious actors. 
2.1. Leaking Information via IPC 
Applications broadcast private information in Inter-Process Com-
munication (IPC) which is accessible to all other apps. Any apps 
that protect the broadcast with permissions or do not specify the 
target component can receive intent broadcasts. This is not safe if 
the intent contains sensitive information. A malicious   application 
that eavesdrops on sensitive information in IPC can gain access to 
this information. 
2.2. Leaking Information via Logs 
Apps with the READ_ LOGS permission can read the log       
messages. Personal information is written for Android’s general 
logging interface and URLs containing this personal information 
are logged just before a network connection is made. Therefore, 
apps can access the private information with the READ_LOGS 
permission [4]. 
2.3. Unprotected Broadcast Receivers 
A broadcast receiver is a component [5] issued by applications to 
receive intent messages. A malicious application can forge mes-
sages if the receiver is not protected by permissions. Android has 
introduced “protected broadcasts” for system intent types to elimi-
nate forging, but this appears to have limited impact.  
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2.4. Delegating Control 
Apps use a “pending intent” to delegate actions to other          
applications. An app first generates an intent message as if it was 
performing some action. It then generates a reference to the intent, 
based on the goal component type (restricting its usage). The 
pending intent recipient can fill in the missing fields, but cannot 
change the values. Thus, if the intent address is not mentioned, the 
remote app with the original application’s permissions can redirect 
an action that will be performed.  
2.5. SD-Card Use 
Any application which has access to the SD-card to write or read 
data can also write or read any other application’s data on the   
SD-card. These apps misuse the SD-card by obtaining the path of 
the card’s root and discovering the free space available on the SD-
card. 
2.6. Telephone Service Misuse 
SMS API used in malicious applications [6] holds certain hard 
coded phone numbers that misuse SMS Manager class by imple-
menting methods such as send Data Message(), send Multipart 
text message, send a Text Message() etcetera to pass  values for a 
destination phone number. 
2.7. Audio-Video Background Recording 
Three key APIs are implemented for visual and audio information 
recording i.e. Media Recorder class, Audio Record class and 
Camera class. However, certain malicious applications misemploy 
these classes in the background to steal data since these codes are 
inaccessible to the activity component of the Android OS. 
2.8. Information Database 
Text messages and address book are sharing information which is 
basically stored in a file based database. Many applications     
attempt to hack these files and some of them succeed by bypassing 
android security checks [7]. 
3. Android Application Data Siphoning Pro-
cess 
Malicious android applications could use numerous methods to 
siphon important data from mobile devices. In this section, we 
will look at one example i.e., Android inter-app security vulnera-
bility analysis. This is a vulnerability pattern example explaining 
how Inter-Process Communication (IPC) can also be used among 
Android Apps to hinder data security. Android provides a flexible 
model of IPC that uses a typical application level message, which 
is known as intent. An Android application comprises of multiple 
processes, i.e. Activity, Service that communicates using Intents. 
Additionally, an application process can also send messages (in-
tents) to another application process to perform tasks such as send 
a stext message, take picture, etc. As we will see in the given ex-
ample (Figure 1), how a combination of two benign applications 
that are installed on a mobile device can be used for malicious 
activities. 
4. Potentially Harmful Android Applications 
Android is continuously trying to improve the security of the us-
er’s personal data and the device. Google has decided to warn the 
users for potentially harmful applications (PHA) at the time of 
their installation (see Table 1). To illustrate this, an initial warning 
will be given to users about the applications that can disable the 
features of the Android Security such as SE Linux or root the de-
vice with disclosure and user consent [8-9]. However, some users 
ignore these warnings.  Individuals tend to ignore warnings issued 
by the OS at the installation time. The ignorance of users to read 
the policies at the app installation time has made it easy for attack-
ers to install malicious applications on the users’ devices. Android 
malware that abuses possible vulnerabilities are a great challenge 
for the developers.  
 
Fig. 1: A malicious application exploiting the vulnerability [3]. 
 
Table 1: Potentially harmful applications definitions 
PHA Definition 
 
Hostile  
Downloader 
An application that is not in itself unsafe, but downloads 
other potentially harmful apps. For instance, a gaming 
application that does not contain noxious code, but rather 
relentlessly shows a deceptive "Security Update" inter-
face that installs unsafe applications. 
Mobile  
Billing  
Fraud 
 
Application that charges the user in a deliberate deceptive 
way. Mobile billing fraud is divided into SMS fraud, Toll 
fraud and Call fraud, based on the misrepresentation 
being committed. 
SMS  
Fraud 
Application that charges clients to send premium SMS 
without user knowledge, or tries to camouflage its SMS 
activities by concealing divulgence agreements or SMS 
messages from the device operator informing the user of 
charges or affirming membership.  
Spam An application that sends irrelevant commercial messag-
es to the mobile user’s contact list 
Phishing An application that pretends to be from trustworthy 
resource, request for mobile user’s credentials or billing 
information, and sends this information to a third party. 
Most common targets of phishing attacks incorporate 
banking credentials, debit / credit card no. or online 
banking credentials 
 
Some of the Android malware that made their way to the Google 
Play store and proved to be highly dangerous are spyware, adware, 
backdoors, commwarriors and botnets [10]. 
There is not much information about how the Google app review 
process works or what tools are used to test the applications. But, 
it has been mentioned in the Google developer website that apps 
are not filtered based on the permissions the app uses. Generally, 
the review process takes 2-3 hours. Recently, Google play started 
using a mixed approach which means that some apps can be   
manually tested as-well. Apps need to comply with Google     
developer policies which does not allow network and user data 
abuse, malicious behaviour, improper ways to display ads, inse-
cure user data or offering rewards in return of leaving good re-
views.  
Google play store discourages the installation of apps from any 
third-party marketplace due to security concerns; however, it still 
permits these. Third party developer apps are made available from 
the official play store. Google uses Bouncer (a dynamic analysis 
sandboxed environment), which is a reasonably effective security 
mechanism to restrict any malware from entering the Google Play 
store. Android also has provided the facility of running a          
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verification service, while installing applications from other mar-
ket places.  
For this research two apps, Remit online money transfer app and 
Voice recorder app, were selected for detailed analysis. The     
selection was based on the fact that users often require financial 
apps and voice calling apps. 
5. Tools 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the use and security 
risk of seemingly irrelevant permissions in applications available 
from Google store. This can be done using static and dynamic 
analysis tools. 
5.1. Static Analysis Tools 
Static Analysis is performed without executing the code and hence 
does not influence the device’s functioning. It is done by            
de-compilation and disassembly. The static analysis process    
involves several steps such as extracting n-gram statistics of .dex 
file, disassembling of an application, pattern search for malicious 
API calls and URLs and extraction of relevant information from 
an Android Manifest file such as permission, intents, activities, 
actions, services, and receivers [11]. 
In static analysis, reverse engineering tools are used to analyze the 
code. The reverse engineering approach helps to decompile and 
recompile an AK file. This is crucial to examine the code. Every 
apk file contains three files. First, AndroidManifest.xml, which 
defines the permissions, used in an application, secondly        
Classes.dex which contains all the Java files (Java source code 
needs to be retrieved with the help of another tool) and thirdly 
Resources.arsc which contains Meta information about the      
resources and nodes. 
5.2. Dynamic Analysis Tools 
Dynamic analysis observes the execution of instructions in a real 
time environment, thus looks at the information flow and interac-
tion with other applications. This analysis has performance over-
heads as it performs real time monitoring of apps. Android appli-
cations facilitate several User Interface (UI) gestures, i.e. swipe, 
tap, pinch, back key, menu key keyboard. It is of utmost im-
portance to address all these gestures during app development, but 
unfortunately some of them may unknowingly be missed. This 
may generate multiple entry points for malicious applications. 
Therefore, this analysis triggers these events to prevent serious 
issues. This analysis technique can be implemented on both virtual 
and actual android devices for real time processing [12-13]. 
6. Android Permissions and Application Anal-
ysis 
To gain controlled access of certain system data, critical resources 
and features, Android apps request permissions from the operating 
system before its installation. Permission security models and 
Access Control Lists are the main mechanisms to provide access 
to these resources and maintain security for the users and system. 
However, various malicious android applications misuse these 
permissions (refer to Table 2). 
For this research two apps were selected for detailed analysis, 
Remit online money transfer app and Voice recorder app. In the 
first step, static analysis tools called Androbugs [14] and 
Androwarn [15] were used. Based on the generated reports for 
each application, further analysis about attack surface, vulnerabili-
ties and possible malicious code was performed. In the second 
step, with the help of reverse engineering tools, the application 
was decompiled and a comprehensive analysis was performed. 
 
Table 2: Permission list [3]. 
Android Permis-
sion 
Use Misuse 
 
 
INTERNET 
Allows the applications 
to access the internet via 
opening network sockets 
for transferring data. 
 
Granting this permis-
sion can be misused by 
sending confidential 
user data to unknown 
URL. 
 
ACCESS_ 
NETWORK_ 
STATE 
Allows the application to 
access information about 
the type of network 
available, type of net-
work devices 
Connected, roaming or 
local network and no. of 
failed connection at-
tempts. 
Misused by a malicious 
application for main-
taining user profile 
regarding his network 
information. 
 
ACCESS_ 
WIFI_ 
STATE 
Allows the application to 
access information about 
Wi-Fi network 
 
Can help the malicious 
application in hacking 
the Wi-Fi network and 
sending user data by 
using this information 
READ_ 
PHONE_ 
STATE 
Gives access to critical 
data of phone like 
IMEI/IMSI device identi-
fier, Phone Number, 
Network Operator, Voice 
Mail Box, SIM ID etc. 
Helps the malware 
author to keep track of 
your phone and can 
involve your device in 
malicious activities 
using this 
Information. 
READ/ 
WRITE_ 
EXTERNAL_ 
STORAGE 
 
Allow to read or write 
external storage 
 
Malware can read 
confidential data of the 
user and write its mali-
cious code on External 
storage. 
SEND_SMS, 
RECEIVE_ 
SMS, 
READ_SMS, 
WRITE_SMS 
Allow the activities 
related to SMS 
Help the malicious 
application read, write 
and send user’s per-
sonal Information to 
the malware author. 
ACCESS_ 
COARSE_ 
LOCATION, 
ACCESS_ 
FINE_ 
LOCATION 
Permissions to access 
location related infor-
mation of mobile device 
 
These two permissions 
are used by the mali-
cious applications for 
location based sniffing 
 
6.1. Analysis of Remit Money Transfer App 
This app is meant to transfer money from the US to Pakistan. 
Analysis of the app is discussed with the help of images of results 
from different tools. First the relevance of permissions required 
during installation was evaluated. As seen in Figure 2, the app 
showed many irrelevant permissions which are not justified by its 
functionality. An alternative app (right side image), World remit, 
requires no permissions; it is used to transfer money from any 
country to any place in the world. This app was also tested and did 
not show any suspect behaviour. 
 
  
Fig. 2: Apps permission display 
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Androwarn report as shown in image Figure 3 gives useful infor-
mation like android manifest.xml, API’s used, application infor-
mation and analysis results about possible malicious behaviour in 
an app. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Androwarn report for Remit money transfer app 
 
Figure 4 is a screenshot of Androbugs report, which shows ADB 
backup/debugging are enabled. This means that anyone who has 
physical access to this phone can make a backup of all app data. 
For a money transferring app, it is a quite risky to have this feature 
enabled by the developer. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Androbugs report for Remit money transfer app 
 
Reverse engineering of application: Audio video eavesdropping- 
There are 5 classes for audio and video in this application. In one 
of the class Audiohandler.smali on line 146, it shows a method to 
record audio as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Source code analysis of app 
 
Figure 6 shows that the application has a code to check the phone 
status, whether the phone is ringing or in sleep mode. 
 
 
Fig. 6: Source code analysis of app 
 
Based on Figure 7 showing the class NetworkManager.smali on 
line 612, it can be observed that the method connectivity change. 
This could be used in changing connection to send data to a differ-
ent network. The connection interface ex-filtration means the use 
of malicious code to transfer data from the mobile phone. It also 
has a file storage.smali, which shows backing up of data, on line 
38. 
 
Fig. 7: Source code analysis of app 
 
Figure 8 shows unencrypted transfer of data in Wireshark in which 
encryption should be used to transfer confidential information 
such as user name, account details, password and other infor-
mation. Without encryption, it is easier for someone to steal in-
formation by performing attacks like the man in the middle. 
 
 
Fig. 8: Wireshark shows unencrypted transfer of data 
 
To recapitulate, this app’s analysis demonstrated surprising results 
such as user data misuse (audio video eavesdropping), data backup, 
network and phone abuse and insecure data transfer. 
6.2. Analysis of Voice Recording App 
Permissions displayed by the Voice recorder app as shown in Fig-
ure 9 during the installation seem quite irrelevant for the main 
features it means to provide. The second right-side image shows, 
an alternative app doing the same job with far less permission. 
 
 
Fig. 9: Permissions displayed by Voice recorder app 
 
The result in Figure 10 from virus total shows a type of Trojan 
malware android/generic.z.2ec701!tris.  
 
 
Fig. 10: Virus total detecting a Trojan in app 
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Figure 11 shows there are many classes that deal with phone num-
bers activities (Note a very recent update of this app provided the 
functionality of showing caller id like true caller app, while these 
functions were not available during the testing of this app. Still, 
this does not justify its behavior). 
 
 
Fig. 11: Source code analysis of app 
 
Figure 12 shows that there are many classes to get the user’s exact 
location.  
 
 
Fig.12: Source code analysis of app 
 
As a summary, this app’s main purpose is to record voice but it 
shows a lot of suspect behavior such as accessing external storage, 
contacts, network and user location. 
Table 3 shows the list of Google developer policies violated by the 
selected applications. The following table is a summary of the list 
of vulnerabilities that has been discussed earlier. 
 
Table 3: List of violated Google policies 
 
Violation of Google Developer Policies 
User 
Data 
Device and 
Network 
Abuse 
Malicious 
Behavior 
Wrong Way 
of Display-
ing Ads 
Remit Money 
Transfer 
√ √ √  
Voice   Re-
corder 
√ √  √ 
6. Conclusion 
There is limited research on the security of data that is backed up 
to a server. This is one of the major concerns for security as the 
phone is a primarily an internet device and most of the infor-
mation is backed up and synchronized with a remote server. Find-
ings from analysis of applications demonstrate the insecure user 
data, malicious behavior, and device and network abuse by an 
application. Insecure transfer of confidential data without encryp-
tion speaks volume about an app security. Down-loading apps 
from Google play store do not guarantee security. These apps may 
be capable of stealing sensitive data from mobile phones without 
the user’s knowledge. Android needs to strengthen its Google app 
review process by involving more trusted static and dynamic tools 
and accessing the results of red flag apps manually. The more 
secure phones are based on optimized android OS like Solarin, 
Blackberry dtek60, Blackphone2.   
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